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Abstract
The concept of path dependence is being used in highly deterministic ways in
neo-institutionalist analysis, so that studies using this framework have difficulty
in accounting for, or predicting, change. However, the original Polya urn model
from which path dependence theory draws predicts that alternative paths will be
possible. It can be argued that actors will be able to use these when they perceive
a need to change. This article seeks to capture this possibility through accommo-
dating a Bayesian parametric decision maker, interacting with an environment.
This makes it possible to examine how change may involve such processes as:
the use of past or redundant institutional repertoires; transfer of experience
across action spaces; or from other agents, through networks of structured rela-
tionships; the emergence of perceived “one best” solutions. This approach points
to the need to change how typologies are used in neo-institutionalist research, so
that those features of cases which do not fit the pre-conceived framework of a
type are not disregarded as “noise”, but properly evaluated as potential re-
sources for change.
Zusammenfassung
Das Konzept der Pfadabhängigkeit wird im Rahmen neo-institutionalistischer
Analysen äußerst deterministisch verwendet. Daher haben Untersuchungen, die
auf diesem Ansatz beruhen, Schwierigkeiten, Wandel zu erklären bzw. voraus-
zusagen. Das der Theorie der Pfadabhängigkeit zugrunde liegende Modell der
Polya-Urne geht jedoch davon aus, dass verschiedene Pfade möglich sind. Es
lässt sich zeigen, dass Akteure auf diese Pfade zurückzugreifen können, wenn sie
Veränderungen für erforderlich halten. Das in diesem Discussion Paper ver-
wandte Modell integriert einen Bayesschen Entscheidungsträger, der in Kenntnis
der die Situation steuernden Parameter auf eine sich ändernde Umwelt reagiert.
So kann untersucht werden, wie Wandel mit Prozessen wie den folgenden ein-
hergehen kann: Verwendung früherer oder redundanter institutioneller Reper-
toires; Erfahrungstransfer über Handlungsräume hinweg; Erfahrungstransfer
von anderen Akteuren und durch Netzwerke strukturierter Beziehungen; Ent-
stehung von Problemlösungen, die als „die eine optimale Möglichkeit“ wahrge-
nommen werden. Fazit der Betrachtung ist, dass die in der neo-institutionalisti-
schen Forschung verwendeten Typologien einer Anpassung bedürfen, damit
diejenigen Fallmerkmale, die sich nicht in den vorgefassten Analyserahmen eines
„Typs“ einfügen lassen, nicht als „Rauschen“ außer Acht bleiben, sondern als
potentielle Ressourcen für Veränderungen angemessen analysiert werden.
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Path dependence has become a key concept in social-scientific debates about in-
stitutional evolution over the past decade. Political scientists, sociologists, econ-
omists and geographers have sought to use the concept as a means of understand-
ing institutional stickiness; that is, why actors may fail to respond to changes in
the environment, even when such responses would lead to a better overall out-
come.1 Thus, path dependence serves explicitly as a counter to those forms of
economic theory which posit that interactions between economically rational ac-
tors will lead to efficient outcomes (North 1990b; Pierson 2000b), and argues in-
stead that inefficient equilibria may be stable. This broad claim stems from the
basic theoretical foundations of path dependence theory, which seeks to model
situations in which there are increasing rather than decreasing returns. In such
situations, inefficiencies and sub-optimal allocations of resources can persist over
time, even when actors are aware of them and are economically rational. But path
dependence theory cannot strictly speaking be used to address actors coping with
changes to their environment, because it does not explicitly model that possibil-
ity. We plan here to remedy this by providing a simple account of how individual
actors may seek to respond to an environment with increasing returns, through
patterns of behaviour that are themselves subject to increasing returns, as most
patterns of behaviour are. Our central focus is therefore on how path dependent
development trajectories interact with exogenously changing environments.
Path dependence theory needs this adaptation: since major change does some-
times occur, the theory is in danger of becoming excessively determinist and in-
capable of coping with major innovation except as behaviour derived from imita-
tion or completely exogenous learning.2 In itself it offers little insight into the
conditions under which paths may change; it takes its fundamental inspiration
from mathematical processes (Polya urn models) in which initial conditions may
have a determinative effect on subsequent paths of development. Some scholars
recognize the need to address path dependence theory’s deficiencies here, but
have few direct solutions to offer (Pierson 2000a). Others have more or less ex-
cluded the possibility of change from their models, seeing path dependence as a
near-inexorable force structuring outcomes over the long term (Putnam 1993).
This has relevance for the study of institutions’ effects on actors’ ability to re-
spond to unexpected crises or changes. By far the greater preponderance of work
in the social sciences has emphasized how institutions may involve “lock in” –
i.e., how they may hamper actors in their efforts to respond to changed environ-
                                                  
1 For a representative sample, see North (1990), Putnam (1993), Pierson (2000a, 2000b),
Thelen (1999), Deeg (2001).
2 “Exogenous” here means exogenous to the specific environment within which the
actors operate. We develop this point in the body of the paper.
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mental circumstances, not only including the literature on path dependence, but
also some of the sociological literature on embeddedness.3
When applied too simplistically, these accounts underestimate the possibilities of
change and innovation; i.e. how actors may respond imaginatively to new sets of
circumstances, and employ previously unconsidered institutional resources in
their responses. This is a problem of application rather than fundamental theory.
Path dependence, in its original formulation, implies the existence of alternative
paths of development than the one taken, which may be “rediscovered” when
actors face a changed environment which makes new demands. Embeddedness
theory, for its part, was formulated precisely in order to provide an alternative to
both “oversocialized” and “undersocialized” conceptions of human action (Gra-
novetter 1985), and, properly speaking, examines how social ties may enable so-
cial action as well as constraining it. However, empirical work has tended to
stress how increasing returns to scale and embeddedness lead to lock-in, rather
than out of it.
In this article, we seek to provide a coherent account of how actors may seek to
adapt to changed environmental circumstances through changing their institu-
tional responses to that environment. Here we adopt a functional account of in-
stitutions, but not a functionalist one. We posit that institutions exist in order to
fulfil certain purposes, and that actors will seek to adapt institutions in response
to changes in their environment, but we make no claim that institutional adapta-
tion is driven by systemic factors, or that institutional change tends towards so-
cial efficiency.4 A fundamental problem with functionalism is of course its neglect
of power relations (Knight 1992). While power relations do not figure in path de-
pendence as such, they may create external constraints that affect actors’ ability to
                                                  
3 Broadly speaking, there are two explanations of lock-in in the literature. First, path
dependence theory itself provides a theory of lock-in. Insofar as the mechanisms of
increasing returns apply, actors may find themselves trapped in a sub-optimal insti-
tutional setting, even when other sets of institutions would clearly be more efficient,
and when these actors know that these other institutions would be more efficient
(North 1990). Second, sociologists have identified a quite different set of factors
which they subsume under the more general rubric of embeddedness (Granovetter
1985). Under these accounts, actors’ particular social ties both allow them to mobilize
certain resources, but close off certain other possibilities of action. If actors lack the
right ties, they may find themselves locked into sub-optimal patterns of behaviour
and unable to respond appropriately to change. This is because their particular ties
with others provide a repertoire of appropriate responses that they may learn from
and apply to changed circumstances (Grabher 1993a).
4 For reasons of simplicity, however, we do not try to model how actors’ behaviour
may itself affect their environment in a recursive fashion. We are grateful to Carlo
Trigilia for bringing this set of issues to our attention.
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choose between paths. We show how power may have this effect in the body of
our paper (the third extension of our model).
More generally, however we seek to advance on the current literature, which is
rather better at explaining the circumstances under which actors will continue to
act as they have always acted, even when their actions are no longer appropriate,
than in discussing how they may adapt to new needs. We provide a simple ac-
count of the factors likely to affect actors’ ability to respond appropriately to
change, which we seek to complicate in successive steps, so as to incorporate new
factors and possibilities that affect actors’ capacities. We acknowledge that we are
likely to annoy many people. Strict path dependence theorists are likely to find
our arguments mathematically underspecified, while many non-rational choice
sociologists, on the other hand, will feel that we have conceded too much to the
formalists. However, it is undeniable that the causal factors emphasized by both
path dependence and sociological approaches are relevant to actors’ capacity to
respond to environmental change, and furthermore, that these factors may inter-
act in complex ways. Frameworks such as ours, which seek to bridge economic
and sociological approaches to the explanation of human behaviour (Di Maggio
1998), represent an important – and arguably necessary – step in the evolution of
debate within the social sciences.
Our arguments emphasize the importance of redundancy in providing resources
which actors may use to respond to unexpected change. There is a recent ten-
dency in the social sciences, and in political economy in particular, to emphasize
how institutional systems tend to crystallize around coherent logics of ordering
(Hall/Soskice 2001). However, such approaches may systematically overlook
fruitful incoherencies within empirical social systems; institutional systems, far
from being coherent, are characterized by redundancies, previously unknown ca-
pacities, and incongruities, which very frequently provide the means through
which actors – whether firms, policy entrepreneurs or others – may seek to tackle
new exigencies. Furthermore, the empirical process of institutional change and
adaptation is likely frequently to involve initiatives that seek to build on these re-
dundant capacities, “breaking” the path rather than continuing along it.
We begin by returning to path dependence theory’s roots, in Polya urn processes,
reformulating the original arguments of Arthur (1994) and others in a manner
that specifically incorporates the important role of redundant resources. We then
seek to build out from the path dependence perspective, progressively building
in refinements that address how social embeddedness may create resources for
actors seeking to respond to change. Next, we examine the significance of our ar-
guments for the methodology of recent approaches to institutional comparison in
political economy. We conclude by summarizing our main findings, and demon-
strating how they may provide an alternative path towards the understanding of
institutional change and adaptation.
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Current Debates on Path Dependence and Change
Path dependence had its origins in recent developments in economic theory
which seek to take account of how increasing returns may complicate equilibrium
analysis. Neo-classical economists have typically worked on the assumption of
decreasing returns, which allows more analytically tractable models in which ra-
tional economic actors will typically tend to converge towards the efficiency
maximizing equilibrium. Path dependence, in contrast, suggests that there is no
necessary tendency towards efficiency in situations where increasing returns ap-
ply. In a situation where there are a number of possible equilibria, path depend-
ence theorists suggest that early moves will often have a decisive effect in deter-
mining which of these equilibria is chosen. Insofar as these early moves may have
a self-reinforcing impact on the probability of later moves, the final equilibrium
reached will by no means necessarily be the most efficient one. Thus, path de-
pendence theory predicts that sub-optimal paths of development may be taken,
which may persist even over the long term, and even in situations where actors
realise with hindsight that a different set of initial moves would have been to eve-
rybody’s advantage.
The theory of path dependence builds upon mathematical modelling techniques –
so-called Polya urn processes – in which early events in a series have a substantial
effect on later ones. Path dependence thus seeks to capture the frequently ob-
served phenomenon that performance of an action can in itself make more likely
its subsequent performance (Arthur 1994). This is very different from the more
familiar case in probability theory, where if one tosses a fair coin repeatedly, or if
a blind agent repeatedly draws one of two balls, one red one white, from an urn
and simply replaces them after each draw, there is an equal probability of either
outcome. In both cases, the aggregated outcomes will tend towards a 50:50 ratio
of heads to tails, or red balls to white balls, over repeated iterations. While one of
the two possible alternatives might have a temporary dominance in the first few
tosses or draws, this dominance will disappear over time.
Path dependence, in contrast, seeks explicitly to model circumstances in which
early events increase the possibility of later events of the same sort occurring. As-
sume that every time a ball of a particular colour is pulled from the urn, it is re-
turned, and a further ball of the same colour is added to it (Arthur/Ermoliev/
Kaniovski 1987). Any random dominance of one colour in the first few rounds
now has major consequences. The chances of pulling further balls of that colour
rather than the other now increase sharply, and are further reinforced in sub-
sequent rounds. Its dominance continues to increase, and eventually the second
colour will be drawn only rarely. Formally, the ensuing pattern takes the form of
a random walk on a convex surface (Arthur 1990).
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Arthur and others (David 1992a, 1992b, 2000) argue that many economic situa-
tions are better modelled using increasing returns assumptions. For example,
many scholars working on the economics of geographic location have argued that
firm location tends to be dominated by pre-determined factors, such as alloca-
tions of basic inputs, so that the location of firms across a given territory reflects
an efficient allocation of resources. While these models provide a good explana-
tion of how firms in industries with clear geographical needs locate, they are far
poorer at explaining the forces governing the location of firms in industries which
have less need for exogenously allocated resources (e.g. knowledge-based ones)
(Arthur 1994). Firms in these industries will often want to locate themselves not
where basic inputs are to be found, but where other firms in the same industry
are to be found. Thus, it is possible that agglomerations will be affected by chance
events early in their history, when the first firms to arrive made random choices
of where to locate, but whose existence then attracted resources such as skilled
labour to the area, creating positive reasons for further firms to go there.
Path dependence further predicts that stable equilibria may be reached given in-
creasing returns to scale, but that in many important instances one cannot predict
ex ante which equilibrium will be reached, because of the importance of initial
perturbations to the final outcome. In more technical terms:
Fluctuations dominate motions at the outset; hence, they make limit points reach-
able from any initial conditions. But they die away, leaving the process directed
by the equivalent deterministic system and hence convergent to identifiable at-
tractors.    (Arthur 1994: 123)
The lessons of path dependence extend considerably beyond industrial location
theory. They are of direct relevance to social scientists insofar as they touch on
questions of institutional development. Douglass North (1990a) argues that insti-
tutions too are subject to the forces of increasing returns. In what is perhaps the
most influential application of path dependence theory, he seeks to explain a
near-inexplicable puzzle for efficiency based approaches to economics; why it is
that countries in the developing world have not converged on the more efficient
set of institutions offered by the developed world. He argues that the divergences
in the economic histories of North and South America may in large part be ex-
plained by the differing initial institutional matrices they inherited from Spain
and Britain respectively.5 Most recently, Paul Pierson (2000a, 2000b) has sought to
build upon this by offering a more general set of insights into institution-building
as a path dependent process. In Pierson’s argument, initial institutional steps may
have a strong conditioning effect on later ones. Insofar as institutions generate
                                                  
5 We note that North’s account of institutional development in South America may be
criticized for its lack of attention to the role of power relations; see Knight (1992),
Solokoff and Engerman (2000); also Karl (forthcoming).
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learning effects, coordination effects and adaptive expectations, they may sub-
stantially affect trajectories of institutional development, so that later institutions
reflect these earlier steps. Positive feedback may in turn lead to a single equilib-
rium that is likely to be resistant to change. As Pierson further points out (see es-
pecially Pierson 2000b), this provides an alternative to functionalist variants of
rational choice institutionalism.6
Thus, path dependence gains much of its explanatory interest from its demon-
stration that persistently inefficient equilibria may result from initial choices.
Even in situations where paths of institutional development are clearly inappro-
priate to the current environment, they may persist; the costs of moving from one
path to another may be extremely high, and much too high for any individual
actor to take on her own. However, major change does occasionally occur, and
path dependence theory offers little guidance as to how changes of path may be
modelled. For example, Karl (1997) makes good use of the theory to explain why
nearly all petroleum-dependent economies have found it impossible to diversify,
even when it was fully recognized by policy-makes that diversification was es-
sential. But she cannot use the theory to help explain why the one major excep-
tion – Norway – failed to follow this path.
While Arthur (1994: 118–119) offers some preliminary contentions about the
likely costs of changes, these do not serve (nor are intended to serve) as a theory.
Two responses to this may be seen in the literature. Sophisticated applications of
the theory (North, 1990a; Pierson 2000a) acknowledge the difficulty. They seek to
avoid determinism, arguing that short periods of wide-ranging change are likely
to be succeeded by much longer periods in which change continues, but is rela-
tively closely bounded (Pierson 2000a);7 but they fail to advance arguments about
what such wide-ranging change involves, and how actors will respond to it.8 Less
sophisticated versions misunderstand path dependence, arguing that paths are
set at a given point in time, so that actors are ineluctably condemned to follow
out a specific trajectory without possibility of change or exit.9 Under such ac-
                                                  
6 As Miller (2000) points out in response to Pierson, by no means all rational choice
theories of institutions are functionalist, and basic results of rational choice theory
suggest that inefficient outcomes are likely to be the norm in common social dilem-
mas. See, more generally, Knight (1992, 1995).
7 This conception of closely bounded change may be nicely captured using Levi’s
(1996) analogy of path dependence with a tree, where larger boughs or branches ex-
foliate into smaller branches, which in turn exfoliate into twigs.
8 Pierson (2000a: 265) limits himself to observing that change is bounded “until some-
thing erodes or swamps the mechanisms of reproduction that generate continuity”.
9 See, for example, the account of Italian regional development in Putnam (1993).
While Putnam suggests in his conclusions that change is possible, he does not seek to
integrate this suggestion with the main body of his argument, which emphasises
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counts, paths of development exercise an influence so compelling that outcomes
are more or less completely determined.
Introducing a Bayesian Actor: Why Redundant Capacities Are Important
As we have discussed, path dependence theory seeks to apply results derived
from Polya urn processes to the understanding of causal processes in which ear-
lier events in a sequence have a positive effect on the probability of similar events
occurring later in the sequence. In the following discussion we wish to build from
the same set of assumptions, but with a single, highly important difference. Most
conventional accounts of path dependence (e.g. Arthur 1994) fold the individual
agent and her reaction to the action of others into the sequence itself (though
some formulations (e.g. North 1990a) seek, as we do, to take account of the cog-
nitive effects of institutions). A firm makes a location decision which may reflect
the previous location decisions of other firms, and may in turn affect the future
decisions of other firms still. Path dependence theory thus models the action of
the agent as itself a single step in the mathematical process.
In this paper we wish to suggest some fruitful complications (Hirschman 1970) to
this model. Specifically, we wish to examine the actions, and more precisely the
decision to act, of the individual agent in greater detail. In order to do so, we treat
the agent’s own action sequence in isolation from its effects on the environment,
although we allow the agent to update her behaviour in order to respond to envi-
ronmental path dependences. Path dependence assumes a process in which balls
are taken from an urn, and replaced according to a specific logic. Our model dif-
fers in that it posits an agent that seeks to match developments in her environ-
ment by drawing from a separate urn. Assume an agent (A), and an environment
(E). Each round, A incurs some small fixed cost, K, regardless of her action. Fur-
ther, assume that both the agent and the environment draw balls from separate
urns. Balls in each urn may be either red or white. As in Arthur’s (1984) original
example, when a ball of either colour is drawn from either urn, it is replaced, and
a new ball of the same colour is added to that urn. Both A and E draw balls un-
sighted from the urn; however, A, unlike E, may ascertain her ball’s colour after it
has been drawn, but before she has seen E’s ball. For a cost, C, which is additional
to K, she may replace it and draw a new one, and may repeat this procedure until
she has drawn a ball with which she is satisfied. E then draws its ball. Only A’s
final choice of ball will be returned to the urn along with another one of the same
                                                                                                                                                 
how the dead hand of path dependence weighs on current political outcomes. On
Putnam’s misuse of path dependence theory, see Levi (1996).
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colour. If the final choice matches the colour then drawn by E, A receives a re-
ward, R. The exercise is repeated infinitely. Under these circumstances A will
seek to maximize the sum of rewards, subject to some discount factor, , so that
future rounds of the game are not valued as much as the current round.
Assume further that A is a risk-neutral Bayesian decision-maker with knowledge
of the basic parameters of the game (in particular that both her urn and that of the
environment E are subject to increasing returns).10 If A wishes to maximize the
sum of her rewards, she will need to solve a problem: given her information
about which balls have been drawn, are the draws from E’s urn on a path Pr, in
which red balls predominate, or Pw, in which white balls do? Bayesian calculation
allows her to update her beliefs in each round, given the ball that E has played.
This provides a simple account of how individual actors may seek to respond to
an environment with increasing returns, through patterns of behaviour that are
themselves subject to increasing returns, as most patterns of behaviour are (repe-
tition allows learning). On the aggregate level it also presents a very basic account
of how actors may adapt institutions to a given environment. Like individuals,
organizational actors may develop a standardized repertoire of institutional re-
sponses as they seek to adapt their behaviour to a given environment. We do not
solve the problem for particular parameter values; rather, by setting it out in a
general fashion, we seek to come to a better understanding of the sensitivity of
the model to changes in these parameters.11 Through seeking successively to
“match” behaviour or institutions to the demands of the environment, an actor
may seek rewards. Most particularly, while the actor has no control over the envi-
ronment, E, she does have some control over her own urn, and through deliber-
ately selecting balls, may seek to take advantage of the increasing returns from a
specific course of institutional adaptation. We note that this account bears a
strong resemblance to strategic games, most notably the Matching Pennies game,
which has no equilibrium in pure strategies. However, what we seek to model
here is not strategic action; rather it is an exercise in parametric decision-making,
where a player seeks to respond to an environment which is not itself a strategic
player.
                                                  
10 For the application of Bayesian principles to social situations, see Breen 2000; West-
ern 2000.
11 We note that our use of quasi-mathematical notation may give an impression of
greater precision and formality than is in fact the case. As should become apparent,
we do not seek to use sophisticated formal theory, and we accept that some of our
conclusions may be difficult to prove in mathematical terms at the level of generality
that our arguments involve. However, we contend that our manner of explication is
appropriate to our purpose, in that it allows us (a) to specify better the linkages be-
tween our arguments and the basic contentions of path dependence theory, and (b)
to express our arguments with a higher degree of clarity than would be possible in
everyday language.
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In the first round of the game, A will know that there is a 50:50 chance of either
red or white being drawn by E, and will not wish to incur the cost C, so she will
simply present the ball that she has drawn at random. Let us assume that E es-
tablishes a path Pr soon thereafter, in which red balls predominate, in a random
walk across a convex surface. A will conclude at some point that E has begun to
establish this path,12 and, if her expected rewards for so doing outweigh her ex-
pected costs, will begin to invest in search costs in order to present red balls.13
The speed of A’s adaptation to red path dominance will be a function of the vari-
ables: C, R, , plus a random element dependent on the “luck of the draw”. In
most circumstances, one may expect the dominant colour to become more quickly
established thereafter for A than for E – insofar as A is capable of forming beliefs
about the environment and its future course of development, and guiding her
own institutional path so as to match that of the environment. It must be remem-
bered that red does not achieve 100% dominance; white balls remain in both urns
and, until the number of red balls approaches infinity, stand a small but finite
chance of occasionally being drawn.
This provides a simple model of how behavioural routines or institutions may
become matched to their environment. But what happens if the environment
changes? Let us assume that for some exogenous reason E’s urn is switched for a
new one, containing again a single red and a single white ball, under the same
conditions as for the original urn.14 In this instance, however, draws from the urn
become dominated by Pw, so that white becomes established as the dominant
colour.
                                                  
12 For the sake of simple presentation we ignore the possibility that A reaches a con-
founded learning equilibrium (Breen 2000). However, we note one interesting impli-
cation of such equilibria; they involve players converging on a set of beliefs in which
they attach positive probabilities to each of the possible states of the world. This may
lead to lower returns on any particular path, but may also make it easier for players
to adapt to exogenous changes of the rules of the game, which involve switching
from one path to another.
13 We note that for some parameter values expected benefits will be less than expected
costs, so that A will be unwilling to incur such costs. However, these are theoretically
uninteresting for our purposes.
14 We note that such change is not incorporated into the initial parameters of the game.
It would be possible to do so by having some probability p at each stage of the game
that E’s urn would change. In this case, A’s expected payoffs would take p into ac-
count. However, what we wish to examine is the possibility of entirely exogenous
change, which belongs to the category of uncertainty rather than risk, and thus can-
not be anticipated by the actor involved. Thus we assume that A is aware that there is
some possibility of path change occurring, but cannot assess that possibility ex ante;
she is in a situation of uncertainty. Ex post, however, she may realize what has hap-
pened after she updates her beliefs due to disconfirming evidence. This is rather diffi-
cult to describe using formal Bayesian analysis, but provides a reasonably good account
of how real actors will behave in conditions where unpredictable changes may occur.
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In Breen’s (2000) terms, the agent perceives the change from the perspective of
her existing beliefs, but cannot immediately move to new, more appropriate ones.
Depending on her precise beliefs, it is likely that A will at first consider the sud-
den appearance of white balls as examples of the occasional appearance of this
colour which she has always experienced and has learned to disregard. Guided
by this belief, A will persist with her path-dependent behaviour, and will con-
tinue to present red balls. After a time however it will become clear to her that
there has been a true change of probabilities, and that her earnings are seriously
declining. The length of this time period will depend on the strength of her be-
liefs, as well as a random factor. There will come a point where A realizes that she
needs to locate white balls and may deem it rational to incur considerable search
costs if necessary. A’s willingness to switch to the new white path when she real-
izes this is appropriate will depend on three factors: (i) the relationship between
costs (C, K) and rewards (R); (ii) the ratio of red to white balls in A’s urn; and (iii)
, the extent to which A discounts the future.
Clearly these parameters permit a wide range of variation; for purposes of illus-
tration we examine two extreme cases. First, take the case where costs are high
relative to rewards, where A’s urn has a strong preponderance of red to white (so
that it is difficult to switch over), and where  is high, so that A discounts future
rewards heavily. Under such parameter values, A is unlikely to incur the costs
necessary to change the path in her own urn, so that she may consistently find
white balls to match those of E. Given the cost K incurred each round, A will ex-
pect to incur losses if she seeks to remain in the game for the rare occasions when
E presents a red ball given white ball dominance. A’s expected future earnings
from the game will very likely be outweighed by her costs, so she may be ex-
pected to leave the game if she can.
Alternatively, if rewards are high relative to costs, there is a relatively low pre-
ponderance of red to white balls in A’s urn, and  is low so that A places a rela-
tively high value on future rewards, one may expect A to seek to respond to the
change in the environment by changing the path dependence of her own urn. She
will accept search costs in order to find white balls, and may thus come to estab-
lish white ball dominance. Search costs will then decline and earnings rise.
Clearly this may involve a lengthy transition period.
At the level of generality which our arguments involve, it is impossible to specify
more precisely the relationship between the parameter values and the extent to
which mid-range outcomes (in which some parameters point in one direction and
others in another) will tend to involve A leaving the game, or incurring the neces-
sary costs to remain in it. However, by specifically incorporating learning and
adaptation costs, our model provides important insights into how actors will re-
spond to “crises” in situations of path dependence. Both in situations where ac-
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tors respond to the situation by abdicating, and those where they seek to adapt
directly to changed environmental circumstances, they are likely to take some
time to understand and respond to the changed situation. Indeed, they will be
likely to perceive initial difficulties as conjunctural – random and temporary ab-
errations from a long-run trend – rather than secular changes in the trend itself.
More particularly, the model provides some basic insights into what change is
likely to involve. A is capable of drawing both red and white balls from her urn in
order to respond to a given environment. These may serve as a simple proxy in
our argument for different possible patterns of behaviour, or even more generally
different paths of institutional development, which respond to different varieties
of increasing returns in the environment, and themselves involve increasing re-
turns (Pierson 2000a). Insofar as a path becomes established in the environment
(so that, say, red balls predominate in E’s urn), a given set of responses which are
well matched to that environment (red balls in A’s urn) may also come to pre-
dominate. Other institutional possibilities exist (white balls in A’s urn), and in-
deed may continue occasionally to affect actors’ responses to the environment.
Even when A has established red-ball dominance in her urn, she will occasionally
draw white balls, which, insofar as they do not match the red balls typically pro-
duced by E, will be viewed as examples of institutional misfit and inefficiency.
However, in situations where the environment has changed (E’s red-ball domi-
nance switches to white), such apparent examples of maladaptation change their
significance, so that they become dominant resources, which actors will seek to
draw upon, in order to respond better to changed circumstances. (White balls
had, in fact, been cases of potentially useful redundancy during the period of red
domination.) A, if she is not driven out of the game, will search out the occasional
white balls that have always presented themselves, in order to establish a new
pattern of behaviour, or institutional path of development, which has always
been implicit, but has previously been submerged by a dominant alternative
logic. In contrast to prevailing arguments which see change as either involving
adjustments along a specific path of institutional development, or perhaps a cas-
cading system collapse, this model tells us that agents can resolve their crises by
adaptation to new paths rather than either recourse to completely exogenous so-
lutions or collapse. This will be so provided that they have access to “dormant re-
sources”, different from their existing path dependence but available within their
overall repertoire of responses.
There are limitations to this simple model, some of which we shall seek to ad-
dress in more fully specified versions below. It does not address institutional
change which results from wholesale borrowing or imposition of institutional
practices from “outside”. It thus limits itself to endogenous change, as funda-
mental to it is the claim that agents can change to new ways of behaving if they
have some endogenous access to appropriate new behaviour. It cannot deal with
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totally exogenous, bolt-on institutional borrowing. One may take the efforts of car
manufacturers in Britain and Germany to introduce Japanese work practices in
the 1980s. To the extent that such change involved the introduction from outside
of completely novel institutions, our arguments have little contribution to make.
However, insofar as efforts to adapt to these new challenges made use of older,
pre-existing institutional repertoires (Morris/Imrie 1992; Braczyk/Schienstock
1996),15 our model may contribute to the understanding of such change.
Second, we note that our model presents a stylized picture of reality. A’s need to
find the matching ball for the environment may implicitly suggest, at least in this
simple version, that there is “one best way” to respond to a given set of environ-
mental pressures, and that A has (at least potentially) the necessary capacities to
respond in this fashion. In reality, A will often be more likely to try to use certain
forgotten capacities to provide a response to the new challenge which is function-
ally equivalent to the proffered one best way and more amenable to her. This re-
sponse will not necessarily be the most efficient possible. We shall address this
possibility more fully below; for the present we merely reaffirm that our argu-
ments have the simple aim of using results from probability theory to model so-
cial outcomes, incorporating actors’ limited abilities to try, at a cost, to adjust to
those probabilities.
Our arguments highlight a relatively under-appreciated implication of path de-
pendence theory: that more than one path of institutional development is possi-
ble, even if only one becomes established.16 This means that the theory is only
applicable to cases where alternatives exist somewhere within agents’ repertoires,
but have become forgotten or hidden through disuse or failure to appreciate their
possible relevance.17 However, they remain in existence (occasional white balls
on a red dominant path), and may provide the seeds for new paths of develop-
ment. If such possibilities do not exist, then in principle the path dependence
                                                  
15 See also Herrigel (1993) on the conditions under which internationally oriented large
firms have sought to make use of, or alternatively displace local paths of develop-
ment, in their efforts to respond to a changed environment.
16 In our simple example, we assume there are two such ways; as we illustrate below, a
number of paths of institutional development may be possible in a given set of social
circumstances.
17 Something of this is embodied in Douglas’s (1987: 66–67) adaptation of Lévi-Strauss’s
idea of bricolage. For Lévi-Strauss this idea of rummaging around in disused practices
for ways of solving problems was specific to “primitive” societies; Douglas sees that
it might happen equally in “advanced” ones. But both see it as essentially conserva-
tive practice, rather than as a potential springboard for true innovation. Our formu-
lation of the possibility of change within the initial model is a case of bricolage, but
once we consider the transfer of practices from one field to another in which they
have not previously been applied (as in the extensions), there is a possibility of true
innovation.
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frame of reference is not applicable. Many current uses of path dependence the-
ory by social scientists do not include the idea of hidden alternatives. They make
the assumption that a path is irrevocably set, so that agency has no scope to
change it. Strictly speaking these writers do not need path dependence theory;
merely the simple argument that agents’ possibilities to create change are entirely
circumscribed by social structure. While our model predicts that paths under
given sets of parameter values will be very difficult or costly to change, it does
not predict that path change is impossible, and indeed sets out a set of conditions
under which change will be more or less difficult to accomplish.
Many empirical cases approximate to our arguments. First, there are those where
what innovating agents do is to discover a new application or adaptation of a
routine which they already practise. The German vocational training system em-
bodies a wide and complex set of formal and informal institutions. From time to
time it has undergone crisis as economic and technological changes create an en-
vironment that no longer matches its assumptions. However, in each case those
responsible for implementing the system – a large number of agents in fact – have
found ways of adapting it, within the framework of the apprenticeship concept,
to the new challenges. Initially designed for the Handwerk sector, it was success-
fully adapted to large-scale industry (Streeck 1992); designed for manufacturing,
it had to adapt to services sectors; designed for the lower levels of educational
qualifications, it was adapted to the rise in educational achievements (Crouch/
Finegold/Sako 1999: ch. 5); designed for specific skills, it adapted to polyvalence;
most recently it has been adapting to the new highly flexible occupations in mass
media industries (Baumann forthcoming). There was often a time-lag while this
adjustment was made, while those concerned either persisted with the old ver-
sion or failed to find a means of adaptation. However, the fact that change was
possible without either a total collapse of the model or exogenous borrowing
means that the problem was solved by considering hitherto unrealized potenti-
alities of the system. Furthermore, the adaptations made involved substantial
changes in the path of the system’s overall development; they were not simple
returns to an existing path after temporary shocks. The fact that this kind of sys-
tem contains, as it were, seeds of potential adaptation within itself means that it is
not an instance of actors being trapped in a social structure, or knowing one thing
and one thing only. Rather, there is a bundle of possible paths hidden like the
white balls in the urn, some of which are concealed by lack of use.
Strictly speaking, the German vocational training case is an example of retracing
past steps in an exfoliation process. Once a new branch has been selected, actors
proceed along its path and become dependent on it. When they recognize that the
path is no longer bringing them returns, they may be able to return to where they
selected that branch from a more generic starting point and begin to forge a new
path from there. To regard this as a mere case of rediscovering the white balls
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therefore over-simplifies a complex process of change . However, our model of-
fers a simple way of comprehending these sorts of change, and how it may be
possible to return from a specialized application of a path to the more generic
choice situation from which the path originated.
Ebbinghaus and Manow (2001) refer to a very similar concept in their idea of
“layered” institutions within welfare states, which they use to show how various
European welfare states have defied the predictions of some path dependence
analysts and have reformed themselves. As institutions develop over long peri-
ods of time, argue Ebbinghaus and Manow, they cease to embody a simple logic,
but a complex bundle, dormant elements of which may open up possibilities for
change at difficult moments.
This logic may also apply to unintended consequences. Imagine a policy that
contains components L, M and N. M and N are the main targets of the policy; L is
included by chance or for some unimportant reason. It is therefore not often the
focus of debate, policy renewal, training of staff administering the policy, etc. But
it remains in existence, like the white balls in the urn. At a certain date actors re-
alize that this existing but neglected policy might help solve certain apparently
intractable emerging problems. There are some important examples of this in the
recent history of Dutch social policy reform (Visser/Hemerijck 1997).
A First Extension: Alternative Policy Challenges as Resources for Responses
to Large-Scale Change
The above discussion has shown how, while remaining within the parameters of
path dependence theory, it may nevertheless be possible to model how an agent
may, under certain limited circumstances, be able to effect change and innova-
tion. But many social situations present actors with more complications: consis-
tent action may not be consistently rewarded, and actors may find that they are
occasionally called upon to act differently from the normal case. If the situation is
so confused that there is no normal case, path dependence theory ceases to be of
use, so we confine our attention to those cases where diversity in the pattern of
rewards takes the form of departures from a norm. A particularly important class
of such situations is that involving redundant capacities. By making some addi-
tions to the adapted Polya urn base set out above, we can adapt path dependence
theory to model this form of complexity. The environment now draws from two
urns. After every n rounds of the red-ball game already described (now called the
dominant game) with E (now E1) A plays one round of a subordinate game in a
second environment, E2, in which the path dependence is reversed, white balls
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being the subject of increasing returns. R is the same for both urns. The two envi-
ronments are represented by two separate urns, which refill according to their
opposite path dependences, but A has only one urn. If A has an understanding of
the basic parameters of the game, she will have different Bayesian probability ex-
pectations for the two environments.
Let us further assume that at a certain point, as in the first game, E1’s urn changes
to white dominance; there is no change in E2’s urn. One may assume that for
most values of n, red will again have established a dominance in A’s urn, as in the
simple game. Again, A’s specific behaviour will depend on parameter values. For
higher values of n (white ball dominant rounds are relatively infrequent), and/or
C (searching for balls is relatively expensive), A may simply seek to create a red
ball dependence, and “take her lumps” on the occasional rounds where the urn
switches to E2. Here, A will behave much as she did in the original game, albeit
with lower overall rewards.18 For lower values of n and C – the “interesting”
cases from our point of view – A may seek rewards from both paths, but again
will have lower overall rewards than in the original game. She will not be able to
take full advantage of the possibilities of creating path dependence in her own
urn, and will have to incur higher search costs in matching both E1’s and E2’s
draws. While A knows which game she is playing at any one time, the chances of
finding a red ball at first attempt in the game with E1 are less than in the original
game, while the game with E2 usually requires search costs to locate a white ball.
However, by the same token, when E1’s urn changes, A is able to adjust to the
new path dependence more quickly than in the simple game, because she has a
considerably higher proportion of white balls in her urn. A now finds that play-
ing the two-environment game had greatly eased the transition.
This version of the model represents serendipitous redundancy, in which the
need to switch between two different environments prepares actors better for
completely unexpected changes in one of them. The independent variable here is
the two environments.19 Bayesian actors will not take account of uncertain events
in the future; insofar as they do not involve risk (i.e. expected probabilities), they
                                                  
18 Given that there is a cost K for staying in the game each round, lower values of n may
depress expected rewards so much for certain sets of parameter values that A will
wish to withdraw from the game.
19 Planned redundancy is different; the independent variable here is A’s urn. This
means that one could incorporate some planned redundancy even into the simple,
early model where there is only one urn. If A has some precognition that there is a
substantial positive chance that her environment will change in the future, as in the
first game, she might simply build in redundancy by every once in a while searching
out a white ball. She will do this in the knowledge that this will reduce her own path
dependence (and thus her expected payoffs) while the red ball dominance lasts, but
that it will also make it easier for her to switch whenever necessary.
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cannot be translated into beliefs. They will therefore encounter only serendipitous
rather than planned redundancy. The latter form may however be inserted into
their environment; differing sets of environmental pressures may generate differ-
ent forms of redundancy (Low et al. 2001), or what Goodin (1996) calls institu-
tions which are designed “around the risk of accidents”. An example of its practi-
cal application appears in Hollingsworth and Hollingsworth’s study of the insti-
tutional contexts of major scientific discoveries. The researchers found that insti-
tutions with particularly large numbers of such discoveries to their credit typi-
cally encouraged, even possibly constrained, specialists in one area of science to
sustain knowledge and interest in other areas:
… major discoveries occurred repeatedly because there was a high degree of in-
terdisciplinary and integrated activity across diverse fields of science (thus, scien-
tists with diverse perspectives interacted with intensity and frequency) …
(2000: 222)
Sometimes these scientists might have found this irksome, as they could have
made more progress with their “own research” had they not had to sustain the
subsidiary areas. They may even have fallen behind colleagues in more special-
ized institutes. However, at points of major new breakthrough, where new com-
binations of knowledge were needed and therefore where continuing an existing
line would have been inadequate, they had major advantages over those who
were more specialized. The two-environment game enables us to anticipate this
outcome – but also to explain why the majority of academic institutions are
structured in the opposite way and avoid redundancy by encouraging specializa-
tion. They do not take the risk of losing predictable routine returns by gambling
on the chance of major discoveries.
Garud and Karnøe present several similar examples of such unplanned synergies
in their accounts of technological innovations, and develop an argument con-
cerning redundancy when they say of entrepreneurs that they:
… may intentionally deviate from existing artefacts and relevance structures,
fully aware that they may be creating inefficiencies for the present, but also aware
that such steps are required to create new futures.    (2001b: 6)
North (1990a: 74–81) anticipates the problem of incentives to acquire pure knowl-
edge – which has no immediate pay-off, but might have some in the future – and
sees the particular structures chosen by firms as putting them into better or worse
positions for dealing with it. Within the constraints of pure path dependence the-
ory he has however no way of modelling different potential solutions.
More generally, as many economists acknowledge, their models have extreme
difficulty in dealing with how actors confront uncertainty, as opposed to risk. In-
sofar as actors are willing to incur costs in order to take advantage of future un-
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certainty, they are acting within a Schumpeterian rather than marginalist frame-
work. Hollingsworth and Hollingsworth’s (2000) research organizations were
Schumpeterians, willing to take risks avoided by those engaged in marginal ad-
justments in order to reap large rewards when they suddenly arose.20 Individual
scientists within the institutes may occasionally have preferred to be marginalists,
but they were constrained by the rules of their game. In a Schumpeterian frame-
work, entrepreneurs are agents who either sustain redundant capacities, or en-
gage in temporarily less profitable activities, so that at certain moments they may
boldly grasp new opportunities. Schumpeter himself insisted on the importance
of monopoly for entrepreneurs, arguing that continual strong competition un-
dermined the risk-taking that they required. This insight has been developed by
evolutionary economists in their arguments about the need to protect research
and development departments from erosion by competitive pressure (Nelson and
Winter 1982), which is often more easily accomplished by monopolies (Lazonick
1991). We are here able to go beyond these accounts and identify as fundamental,
not monopoly as such, but the capacity to retain redundant capacities in order to
be able to cope with new or changing environments. Monopoly and limited com-
petition are particular examples of how redundancy might be maintained. Other
examples might be external constraint or simultaneous participation in different
fields of activity, between which cross-over is encouraged. For Hage and Hollings-
worth (2000) the essential point is a number of separate specialized areas which
are connected to each other through an innovation network.
Such arguments about redundancy in scientific and economic entrepreneurship
have clear relevance to paths of institutional development too. Insofar as agents
or their institutions are regularly exposed to different sets of environmental pres-
sures, they will be likely to develop substantial redundancies. These redundan-
cies will often make it easier for agents to adapt these institutions to new and un-
expected sets of environmental circumstances.
A Second Extension: Meeting Major Change with Solutions Already Used
in Adjacent Fields
A different form of complexity concerns situations where the same actors are pre-
sent in more than one institutional context, with different kinds of action being
                                                  
20 Within the economy as such, the chances for super-profits occur because the entre-
preneurial agent is willing to take a risk which others refuse, making possible tempo-
rary rents. (The super-profits of the Hollingsworths’ (2000) scientists are rewards like
Nobel Prizes, which can be seen as a kind of permanent rent.)
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appropriate in different contexts. In such cases an agent might be able to resolve
an impasse reached in one sphere by “borrowing” or extending actions from an-
other. This will be particularly important in the cases of collective actors, operat-
ing over a wide social range. One interesting historical example would be the
way in which late-19th century Dutch elites began to apply lessons they had
learned about conflict management in the religious field (the verzuiling system) to
conflicts emerging in industrial relations which could no longer be tackled in tra-
ditional ways (Hemerijck 1992). They could do this because of their acquired ex-
perience of using these mechanisms, understanding how they operated, and
trusting them; verzuiling in the religious arena had become a self-reproducing
path dependence, involving substantial increasing returns to learning. It would
have been far more difficult, say, for French elites suddenly to imitate emerging
Dutch industrial relations policy, because they did not have the prior learning
experience from a proximate field. Another example would be the case of Nor-
way in Karl’s (1997) comparative study of petroleum referred to above. Norwe-
gian policy makers had wide experience of managing change through widely
representative discursive processes. They were therefore able to use these tech-
niques to address the problem of dependence on a single sector.21
By making some further simple amendments to the situation presented in the
first extension, we can model such possibilities. We now give A two urns, A1 and
A2, provided that she pays each time she chooses to move between them. (It is a
basic assumption of the whole model that all changes of action are costly in one
way or another.) The original search cost C is now Cx; the urn swap cost becomes
Cy. The relationship between Cx and Cy is not determined ex ante. As in the pre-
vious example, we assume that E1 develops a red ball dominance, and E2 a white
ball dominance. In this extension A will swap her urns to match the different path
dependences of E1 and E2, if Cy is not set at an unreasonably high level. We as-
sume for simplicity that A will use urn A1 to operate in environment E1, and will
switch to urn A2 in E2. A will seek to establish a red ball dominance in A1, and a
white ball dominance in A2.
While net profits are ceteris paribus lower than in the first, simplest version of the
game, they will be the same or higher as those in the first extension. When E1’s
urn changes to white dominance, the relative values of Cx and Cy, as well as A’s
Bayesian beliefs will determine her response. If, as we already assume, Cy is low
enough that A has been prepared to switch urns on turns when E played E2, A
will switch to urn A2 in order to respond to E1 as well as E2, and will quickly
start to draw white balls. This allows us to model a situation that is somewhat
different from the redundancies modelled in the previous extension. Now, an
agent who has followed two paths of institution building in two different envi-
                                                  
21 We are grateful to Terry Karl for bringing the relevance of this case to our attention.
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ronments or sets of circumstances may borrow from one in order to escape from
an institutional path dependence in the other which is no longer appropriate. At
its simplest level, this may involve lateral thinking, or, more broadly, as in the
Dutch verzuiling case mentioned above, Wahlverwandtschaft (Hemerijck 1992). This
kind of innovation is more than mere bricolage, because taking responses origi-
nating in one action sphere and applying them in a new one can result in entirely
new actions and institutions.
A Third Extension: Embeddedness in Networks of Policy Fields as a Resource
for Responding to Change
By incorporating innovation through learned behaviour from proximate fields,
we have already gone some way towards bringing the insights of “embedded-
ness” within a framework of path dependence. Such learning allows agents to
“capture” external paths of institutional organization in a limited way; by recog-
nizing this possibility, we open the way to dealing with more obviously exoge-
nous phenomena, like imitations and impositions. In an open world it should not
be assumed a priori that the walls around national or any other systems are im-
penetrable. Multinational firms, educational institutions, immigrants and con-
sultants regularly penetrate them. Pure endogeneity and pure exogeneity should
therefore be seen as end-points of a continuum and should be relativized.22 We
can incorporate this within the model by developing two ideas already implicit
within the second extension: that of different levels of “proximity” of different
urns in the game; and that of costs of switching from one urn to another.
Let us assume that there are N urns, which are used by N agents all playing the
simple game in N different environments. Each player has an urn with two of B
different coloured balls. These agents are not in competition with each other – in-
deed they do not interact directly, although they may copy each other’s actions
(i.e. draw from one another’s urns) – and A is one among them. Further, they are
situated on a plane in which some urns are more distant from A than others;
closer urns are those that are less costly for A to emulate, and further urns are
progressively more costly. Let us assume that A is playing the simple game in
which both she and E have one urn. At some point E begins to draw a new col-
our, which may be any one of B.23 When this occurs, A may draw (blindly) from
                                                  
22 It should be noted that we are here dealing with the endogenous or exogenous na-
ture of their response made by actors, not of the shock which stimulates the need for
change.
23 This is not to imply that there is an equal probability that each of the N urns holds
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other urns in order to find the colour which will bring the reward. A has no prior
knowledge of the colours of the balls in the different urns, but may have some
knowledge of the underlying probability distribution, and may remember the
colour of balls in urns that she has previously drawn from. To draw from another
urn A must pay cost dCy, where d is a positive function of the distance of the urn
from A. This embodies the hypothesis that the difficulty of acquiring access to
new practices increases with distance from the initial practice. “Difficulty” may
be constituted in various ways, such as a learning curve, or difficulty of commu-
nication with those in a remote location. “Distance” may similarly have various
meanings; it may be literal distance, or, more generally, institutional remoteness.
(For a formal demonstration of the importance of proximity for agents solving
learning problems by observing others, see Anderlini/Ianni 1993.)
A’s willingness to search out new balls as her environment changes will depend
on: (i), as always, her Bayesian beliefs; (ii) her acquired stock of knowledge of
urns N-1; and (iii) the relationship between t, d*, Cy and A’s expected future
earnings from finding the proper ball, where t is the expected number of searches
necessary to find the appropriate ball, and d* the expected distance from the urn
containing the right ball.
As in all other forms of the model, these parameters may have values under
which A will prefer not to play, and will abdicate from the game after the path
changes if she has a choice. Here, condition (iii) in particular may be especially
burdensome. A may be faced with a choice of: (a) trying to find a remote solution
at possibly ruinous cost; (b) of searching intensively among more proximate urns,
even in situations where she knows from the underlying probability distribution
that the solution is unlikely to be found close by; or (c) of abdicating from the
game. This models a situation often faced by agents required to adopt exogenous
solutions which do not fit with their past experience and institutional structures.
Even if new ways can be learned given time, they may be so remote from the
agent that success cannot be achieved before a total crisis arrives. There may be
several examples of this in the history of Central and Eastern European countries
during the 1990s. Firms and political elites were in a position where all available
paths of development from the state socialist period seemed to have failed com-
pletely. International agencies and western governments advised these actors that
they must imitate approaches that were extremely remote in terms of their previ-
ous experience. The responses adopted provide examples of all three above pos-
sibilities (a, b and c).
                                                                                                                                                 
the solution, merely that there is a non-zero probability for each of them. For sim-
plicity’s sake, however, we do not specify either the distribution function or A’s
search function.
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The idea of a full set of N possible solutions set at varying degrees of accessibility
from A not only replaces the dichotomy between endogeneity and exogeneity of
responses with a continuum, but brings us beyond the logic of path dependence
to consider constraints on and possibilities of action caused by relationships be-
tween A and a given social structure of opportunity. She is not endowed with
perfect knowledge as in much neo-classical theory, but is dependent on her loca-
tion within that structure for both knowledge of and capacity to use innovations.
The lock-in Grabher (1993b) found in the Ruhr during the crisis of the metals
sector in the 1980s can be seen to be a case of this extension. All actors within the
region were committed to metal manufacture, so that all attempts at solving the
crisis involved attempts to reform that sector and no measures for developing
new activities. In the terms of our model, all new possibilities were too remote
from A to be practicable, while all other reasonably accessible players were com-
mitted to play the same colour as A herself. However, Voelzkow (forthcoming)
has shown that some Ruhr cities at least have eventually been able to find new
paths, largely through the actions of the Land government of Nordrhein-
Westfalen. This agent, which Grabher (1993b) argued was just as embedded as
the Ruhr cities themselves in the metal-industry model, was nevertheless located
so that it had access to other games. (To apply the concepts of Anderlini and
Ianni’s (1993) locality model, agents on the edge of a particular network of em-
bedded relations are likely to have access to other, adjacent networks.) The
eventual success of these cities in changing their course of economic development
is compatible with our theory, which expects lengthy periods of adjustment and
failed attempts to sustain previous paths before actors accept the need for more
radical change, but does not rule out possible eventual success as impossible.
By introducing social structure, we may also begin to incorporate a major factor
that is often neglected by path dependence theories: power. Jack Knight (1992)
defines power as involving the ability to constrain another’s choice set. Under
this definition, we may see how the “distance” of particular urns need not be a
happenstance feature of social structure; instead, it may reflect the power of ex-
ternal actors to make it more costly for A to adopt certain solutions. This again
considerably improves the realism of the theory.
In practice it is often difficult to determine whether simple path dependence or a
more complex sociological embeddedness lock-in is at work (Thelen 1999); the
two may reinforce each other. For example, consider the case of the so-called
Bismarckian systems of social insurance established in Germany and a number of
other countries, which have become deeply embedded, and which are frequently
described in the literature as having produced path dependences. Did these sys-
tems originate as the result of the chance prior appearance of some instances of
these particular schemes, which fact later led to their being adapted as a national
standard? Or were they conceived because they corresponded to a particular bal-
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ance of power and set of social relationships and compromises? If the former, we
have a relatively pure case of path dependence, first-mover advantage and in-
creasing returns as described in the probability theory literature. If the latter, we
are instead dealing with something which needs explanation in terms of the bal-
ance of social relationships, for which path dependence theory is less suited, and
perhaps even unnecessary. However, it may not be easy to disentangle these two
phenomena in empirical situations; indeed, social structural reasons for the per-
sistence of institutions may change over time, as for example new groups acquire
vested interests in old institutions.
For our present purposes disentangling historical origins is not so important as
the other end of the chain of events: understanding the character of practices
which have become locked in, so that change and innovation are difficult. How-
ever an institution originated, some elements of learning curve and returns to
scale may support its persistence against potential alternatives. This is a kind of
quasi path dependence, with different origins from those discussed by Arthur
(1984), but acquiring some characteristics of that model along the way. There is
very likely to be a cluster of supporting and opposing interests, cross-institutional
links, etc., creating a structure of embeddedness.
A Fourth Extension: Functional Equivalents and Renewed Path Dependence
Finally, let us consider how the model might deal with a frequently occurring,
difficult question. Given the strong possibility that functionally equivalent alter-
native solutions exist for many problems, how can agents ensure that, in a situa-
tion of widespread availability of alternative institutional models, they have an
opportunity to choose among various viable possibilities, hopefully finding one
which most “suits” them? This dilemma also presents itself frequently to many
groups in the post-communist societies of central and Eastern Europe. How can
they, acting under conditions of difficulty and a need to make rapid changes, en-
sure that they make those reforms which are best suited to their capacities and
needs? We can adapt our model to demonstrate such a context of choice; it
strongly suggests the conclusion that such actors may have very little chance of
making such optimal choices.
To show this, we modify the third extension (in which A could search through the
urns of her neighbours in order to find a new matching ball when E changes
urns). Now, when E changes the ball colour which it rewards, it is in principle
willing to reward any one of m different colours, where 1<m<B and where m ex-
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cludes red. Let us further assume that different acceptable balls carry different
rewards, R1,…, Rm.
For the purposes of illustration, let us assume that m = 3, with three possible col-
ours (white, blue, magenta). If A has decided to incur the search costs, she
searches for a ball until she finds one for which a reward is presented, and finally
happens upon a magenta one. She now knows that she will be rewarded if she
presents further magenta balls; however, she has no knowledge that blue and
white would also be rewarded, and if she finds any of these in the urns of her
neighbours she will reject them and continue to look for magenta. While we do
not specify any search function, it is reasonable to expect that under many cir-
cumstances, A will start to build up a path dependence in magenta balls. The pos-
sibility of offering blue or white balls will never be discovered, even if presenting
either of these would be more lucrative, or less costly.
Under these circumstances, Bayesian decision-makers can “lock in” to inferior
choices (Arthur 1994). Arthur also presents an example of a search algorithm that
has similar consequences. Under these assumptions, the actual beliefs of agents
have many of the characteristics of path dependent phenomena; they tend to lock
into repeated patterns that are not necessarily optimal. One might go beyond
these arguments, to suggest that in a context where agents observe each other,
such effects may be contagious. Another actor, observing A’s success, might con-
clude that A had indeed discovered an optimal response to a given set of envi-
ronmental problems, and might copy her. This demonstrates how the idea of
“one best way” can become rapidly established even if in reality a “world of pos-
sibilities” (Sabel/Zeitlin 1997) exists, discovery of some among which would
better suit the interests of some agents than the proclaimed one best way.
Implications for Institutional Research
In the previous discussion we have constructed an account of how paths may be
“broken” by actors in their efforts to respond to changed circumstances; we now
wish to suggest that our account has broader implications for the social sciences.
Specifically, we show that it has relevance for current – and important – debates
on institutional systems and their economic consequences. Recognition of the
possibilities embedded in our model and its extensions, each of which has made
the original path dependence model approximate more closely to real-world
choice and action situations, has significant implications for research on institu-
tional change. We can observe action of the kind analysed only if we allow for
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and positively seek elements of complexity, even incoherence, in the empirical
stories we tell. The “stylized facts” beloved of social science, which cut away at
awkward empirical details to fit simple expectations, do not help in this task. Un-
fortunately, the main objective of much current research within the institutional-
ist tradition has been precisely to present national (and very rarely is the onto-
logical priority of the nation state questioned) cases so that they fit neatly into
homogeneous, internally isomorphic types. As we have noted, this approach
dominates the literature on varieties of capitalism (Hall/Soskice 2001), as well as
those on national systems of innovation (Freeman 1995; Lundvall 1992; Nelson
1993), welfare states (Esping-Andersen 1990), and social systems of innovation
and production (Amable 2000; Boyer/Didier 1998).
These accounts assume that national systems possess an overall internal congru-
ence, or they will give contradictory signals to agents (Amable 2000: 657). To the
extent that such relationships apply, it becomes possible to establish the particu-
lar path dependence of a national system and therefore to make strong predic-
tions, not mere post hoc empirical accounts, of the behaviour of agents within it
and the virtual impossibility of their making major changes. Change is likely to
occur only when whole systems change under the weight of exogenous pressure.
These asssumptions give the literature on economic diversity or comparative
capitalism the power to make clear (if often incorrect) predictions, but are by the
same token inappropriate for a research programme in which an escape from
path dependences and embeddedness can be modelled in entrepreneurial discov-
ery of concealed, unacknowledged or surprising potentialities of the available in-
stitutional repertoire. In fact, much recent work in the capitalist diversity litera-
ture makes it impossible by definition to carry out such a programme. These
authors are virtually bound to consider all evidence of modes of action which do
not fit their overall characterization of a given national or super-national system
as untheorized, empirical “noise”, which needs to be disregarded in the interests
of an elegant and sharply profiled account. In contrast, our approach depends
precisely on incongruities, incoherence, and within-system diversities for its at-
tempt to build – not a series of ad hoc empirical objections – but a theory of crisis
resolution and Schumpeterian change that does not require either exogeneity or
prediction of inevitable failure (see also Hage/Hollingsworth 2000: 983).
For example, most accounts of the US-American production and innovation sys-
tem assign it unambiguously to the “liberal market” (Hall/Soskice 2001) or
“market based” (Boyer/Didier 1998) category, regarding it as virtually a para-
digm case. If the vast role of the state-managed defence sector is mentioned it is
as an aside (Amable 2000: 670), or it is somehow argued around until it is pre-
sented as an aspect of the market model (ibid.: 677). One of the problems of a
vaunted paradigm case is that theorists start reading back from its empirical de-
tails into the terms of the theoretical type it is thought to embody. If the role of
Crouch, Farrell: Breaking the Path of Institutional Development? 29
the US defence sector is regarded instead as complementary to the market in the
true sense of that word – providing something substantively different from, and
compensating for deficiencies in, an existing form – a very different account
emerges (Hage/Hollingsworth 2000: 992; Hollingsworth 2000: 605, 613). In the
terms of the current argument, the role of the US Defense Department becomes a
white-ball game played alongside a red (market) one as in the first or second ex-
tensions. Following this path, an account of the US economy would explain its
performance in terms of the range of institutional forms at its disposal, rather
than see it as the realization of one such form. One might similarly present the
high rate of immigration into the USA as evidence of the capacity of firms and
other organizations in that country to draw on a diversity of educational experi-
ences, rather than treat relations between the US economy and the US education
system as an institutional “best fit”. The contribution of educational and cultural
heterogeneity to innovation is already being strongly noted in certain parts of the
Californian software industry.
Conclusions
In the preceding discussion, we have sought to provide a more nuanced account
of change in institutional systems. In order to do so, we have tried to extend and
combine path dependence theories in the following ways, resulting in the identi-
fication of a number of path-changing possibilities.24
1. Through incorporating a Bayesian decision-maker with her “own” urn, more
accurately to model the relationship between actors and their environments;
2. By introducing into the model the possibility of costed searches into other
paths concealed within agents’ own past experience, to enable them to stand a
chance of pursuing possibility one: the use of hidden or dormant alternatives
within their own repertoires;
3. By introducing the possibility of agents playing simultaneous games, to enable
them to pursue possibility two: transfer of experience from different action spaces;
4. By introducing the possibility of agents having costed access to additional
games, to enable them to pursue possibility three: transfer of experience from
                                                  
24 We use “possibilities” rather than “strategies”, because, even if agents behave ration-
ally at each stage of the process, they do not choose a path with perfect knowledge of
its consequences, so that accident, serendipity and structured opportunity play an
important role in the adoption of particular routes.
30 MPIfG Discussion Paper 02/5
other agents through networks of structured relationships – which in turn
helps break down the rigid dichotomy between endogeneity and exogeneity as
sources of actors’ responses;
5. By introducing the possibility of several viable alternatives, only one of which
is likely to be discovered, to model how ideas of “one best way” solutions be-
come established.
This model provides a way of accounting for and studying innovation and entre-
preneurship which is endogenous while at the same time being able to encom-
pass extensive change. Our conclusions are similar to those already reached by
Garud and Karnøe (2001a: xiii) in their model of entrepreneurs as embedded path
creators, as “neither insiders nor outsiders, but boundary spanners”. They reject
the conventional idea of entrepreneurs and innovators as completely original,
even exogenous, forces; entrepreneurs develop along the paths provided by his-
tory, but attempt mindfully to depart from it. By “mindfulness” Garud and
Karnøe (2001b: 23) mean consciousness of embeddedness and knowledge of
when to use it and when to depart from it. They invoke Schumpeter’s (1936)
stress on the need for entrepreneurs to escape from the strict dictates of rational
action. Their entrepreneurs therefore proceed through a path of “chain linked de-
viation” (Garud/Karnøe (2001b: 26). This differs from a random walk in that at
each step the agent places its next step purposively, though it is acting with only
imperfect knowledge.
It must be stressed that we are not contesting the currently dominant approach
with a series of anti-theoretical empirical objections along the lines of classic Eng-
lish historiography. Rather, we propose the following approach to the study of
path dependences – which shares some characteristics with that advocated by Pier-
son (2000a: 494–496). (Despite its growing inapplicability, we assume here the
simple case of a study of an individual area of activity within an individual na-
tion state.) First, the different modes of governance or institutional approaches at
work within the sphere of activity should be discovered following an intensive
research process, and specified in terms of theoretical models. Second, an attempt
should be made to rank the modes found in terms of their relative dominance.
(Here we have a conflict of method with that of the varieties of capitalism school.
Having identified a single dominant system, the former excludes all information
on subordinate systems from further analysis. The present approach retains them
as part of the account.)
Third, a conceptual map must be developed of other institutional spheres within
the society, described according to their proximity to the area of activity at the
centre of the research and according to their accessibility both to agents relevant
to that industry and to those without. Fourth, the different modes of governance
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or institutional approaches at work within these other institutions must be speci-
fied, again in terms of theoretical models. Fifth, an attempt must be made to rank
these in terms of their relative dominance. (Here occurs another conflict with the
varieties of capitalism school. Having identified a single dominant system within
these institutions, this approach demonstrates its Wahlverwandtschaft with the
main object of study, and excludes all contrary information.)
In practice it is unlikely that such a research programme can be fulfilled in its en-
tirety. However, even without adopting such a wholescale approach, two steps
may help adjust research strategy in fruitful ways – neither of which involves re-
sorting to stylized facts and other distortions. First, the range of institutions to be
covered by the research needs to be limited to the scope of available knowledge.
Thus, if there is well established evidence that particular forms of parliamentary
government are associated with certain kinds of production, it is legitimate to cite
such evidence in support of an hypothesized Wahlverwandtschaft. But if thorough
evidence of this kind is lacking, it is not legitimate merely to assume the link be-
cause of its theoretical appropriateness; instead it is appropriate to remain silent
about it.
Second, researchers into complex macro-social phenomena like the wider institu-
tional structure of an economy may have to accept that, despite their theoretical
identity, explanation and prediction are very different activities, and we may of-
ten have to limit ourselves to the former. When an event has already taken place
it is possible with various methodologies to reconstruct how and why it occurred,
and to delve back into the ensemble of wider institutional processes involved. It
is not possible to do this for future events, because researcher cannot tell which
surprising combinations of institutional resources will in practice be used by
creative, entrepreneurial actors – if they can, the changes are not surprising.
We shall continue to be taken by surprise by acts of true Schumpeterian entrepre-
neurialism as opposed to those of Hayekian or Northian incrementalism. We can
however at least conceptualize the likelihood of these occurring in terms of risk-
taking. Schumpeterian actions can be conceived as those which make unexpected
and daring leaps in innovation. If we retain the basic assumption of the theory,
that even such leaps as these have to draw on knowledge which is somehow al-
ready available, an innovative leap can be theorized as a decision to start drawing
balls from a very remotely located and unlikely urn. The idea of the “leap” is very
apt. In terms of the model, this is always possible; but it is costly. Typical costs
will be lack of knowledge whether the innovation will work, because the idea for
it has been pulled from such a remote and unfamiliar institutional location. It is
therefore reasonable to predict that most such attempts will fail, but a small but
finite number will succeed. Further, we can specify the kind of conditions (e.g.
redundancy) which will put agents in a position to carry out such innovations.
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Such a model can be used in a number of different fields. We have taken exam-
ples from economic change, social policy development, and the organization of
science; wherever innovation and entrepreneurship are possible, the model is
relevant.
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